Tuesday, 23 January 2018

What Causes Post-Traumatic Stress?

Today's post features Christopher Mole, Associate Professor of Philosophy, and Chair of the Programme in Cognitive Systems at the University of British Columbia. In this post he outlines a recent debate concerning the causes of intrusive memory in post traumatic stress. 

Christopher has published on this topic in his papers "A methodological flaw in 'The neural basis of flashback formation: the impact of viewing trauma'" (Psychological  Medicine, 46(8), p. 1785) and "Causes and correlates of intrusive memory: a response to Clark, MacKay, Holmes and Bourne." (Psychological Medicine, 46(15), p. 3255).


People often witness events that cause post-traumatic stress in others, without suffering from such stress themselves. Because of that, it has been supposed that the explanation of PTSD should not be sought in the experience of the traumatizing event, but in disruptions to the processes that occur in the days and weeks after it: processes of grieving, coping, and coming to terms.

That supposition is questionable, and an explanation of the fact that only some witnesses to an event will be traumatized by it does not require it. That fact could instead be explained in lots of other ways. Some disgusting event might traumatize Jones, but not Smith, because Jones has just eaten. Some violent event might traumatize Smith, but not Jones, because Smith better understands its consequences. And so on, for any number of other reasons; some to do with differences of situation, some with differences of personality, some with cognitive factors, and some with emotional ones. There is no need to suppose that the untraumatized person has better coping capabilities than the traumatized one.

The several factors that might contribute to post-traumatic stress at the time of the traumatizing event have seldom been studied, partly because the assumption that PTSD is a disorder of subsequent coping has long been the orthodoxy, and partly because such peri-traumatic factors are hard to observe in the lab. A series of experiments has begun to rectify this. The experiments use fMRI to observe the brains of people who are watching films of events such as eye-surgeries and road traffic accidents, and who are therefore undergoing something analogous to a traumatizing experience. 

These participants are then asked to keep a diary, which enables the researchers to ascertain which of the upsetting films are recollected intrusively. Such experiments enable us to identify factors at the time of a traumatizing experience that contribute to its PTSD-like recollection. They have made a crucial contribution to our understanding of the ways in which peri-traumatic factors might contribute to PTSD. (A review of this paradigm can be found here.)

These experiments are undoubtedly of the first importance, but I have a qualm about one way in which their results have been interpreted. To bring the qualm into view, notice that, whereas some of the possible peri-traumatic contributors to PTSD are emotional (Smith is frightened), some are not (Jones has just eaten). One might naïvely suppose that it is always the emotional factors doing the work. Jones having eaten contributes to his trauma only to the extent that it makes him susceptible to an emotion; in this case disgust. Smith’s understanding of the violence contributes to her trauma, only to the extent that it makes her susceptible to an emotion; in this case fear. According to this naïve view, the immediate causes of trauma-symptoms are emotional through and through. That view may ultimately prove to be mistaken. My qualm is that it has been dismissed too quickly. The data that are thought to make trouble for it do not.

Thursday, 18 January 2018

Beyond Concepts

This post is by Ruth Millikan. Ruth Garrett Millikan is Distinguished Professor Emerita at the University of Connecticut. She is a Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Winner of the 2017 Researcher Prize for Systematic Philosophy.



I am a retired professor of philosophy from the University of Connecticut with special interests in thought and language, the ontological structures of the world that support thought and language and the kinds of selection ---- genetic, learning, cultural ---- responsible for their evolution and development.

Beyond Concepts weaves together themes from natural ontology and from the philosophies of mind, language and information. The sprawling topic is Kant's how is knowledge possible? but viewed from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The assumption is that we, along with the other animals, are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is, roughly, as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, the book begins with a discussion of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world.

Central to the view of cognition is the introduction of “unicepts” and “unitrackers” which, together, serve to replace traditional concepts. They are responsible for “tracking” items perceived in different ways and at different times, for recognizing what is the same again as the same again and for storing information thus collected in a way that marks it clearly as information about the same. A novel description of the act of recognizing an identity is central. The ways that various unicept complexes may be developed from experience over time is explored, one conclusion being that the law of noncontradiction acts as a regulative principle in the fashioning of unitrackers, coherence serving as a test for correspondence. The training of unitrackers is not always successful but sometimes leaves behind redundant, equivocal or even empty unicepts or “would-be” unicepts.